A week in family law: No-fault divorce, court reporting, and video hearings

Another short working week has mercifully kept the family law news to a minimum, but I’ve found the following four stories for your delectation:

Firstly, it has been reported in the mainstream media that a millionaire banker is suing his ex-wife for £500,000 in rent, which he claims she should have paid him for occupying the former matrimonial home. Kerim Derhalli and Jayne Richardson-Derhalli were divorced in 2016. They agreed a financial settlement, under which Mrs Derhalli received around £6.5 million from Mr Derhalli, and was due another £5 million after completion of the sale of the home, which was owned by Mr Derhalli. Mrs Derhalli remained in occupation of the property, rent-free. However, the sale was delayed, and in March 2017 Mr Derhalli’s lawyers requested that Mrs Derhalli either vacate the property, or start paying rent for her occupation. She refused, and remained in the property until it was sold earlier this year. Mr Derhalli sued Mrs Derhalli for unpaid rent, claiming £20,000 a month for the two years she remained in the property after being asked to leave. At an initial hearing the judge said: “It is my view that Mr Derhalli was entitled to determine the licence to occupy with reasonable notice. It follows that Mrs Richardson-Derhalli could be considered a trespasser from April, 21, 2017, since when she remains liable to pay for the use and occupation of the property.” The case will return to court at a later date, for an assessment to determine the amount of rent Mrs Derhalli should pay. An interesting case – hopefully, a full report of the judgment will be published in due course.

Secondly, Fiona Bruce, Conservative MP for Congleton (no, not the TV presenter), has spoken out against the government’s plans to introduce no-fault divorce. Ms Bruce, who is a solicitor, says that she believes that the new law risks “an immediate spike in divorce rates, which will impact negatively on the families involved.” She told the Law Society Gazette that the government ignored warnings that the changes will make divorce easier, and said: “The removal of fault sends out the signal that marriage can be unilaterally exited on notice by one party with little, if any, available recourse for the party who has been left. There will be far less pressure, or incentive, to work at the relationship in such circumstances.” With respect to Ms Bruce, I am sure that most family lawyers would disagree. People don’t choose to divorce simply because the law makes it easier, and in any event for most people the new law will not make divorce any easier, or any quicker. The new law is not about making divorce easier, but about making it less acrimonious.

Thirdly, the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane, has released draft guidance, for consultation, on reporting in the Family Courts. The guidance follows a recent case in which a journalist appealed against a reporting restriction order. Whilst the substantive outcome of the case was ultimately agreed between the parties, the President said that it demonstrated that there remained a need for greater clarity and guidance in relation to applications by journalists to vary/lift statutory reporting restrictions, and the purpose of the Practice Guidance is to meet that need. The President said he welcomes people’s views and suggestions to the consultation, which will close on the 30th of June. You can find the draft guidance here. Whether it will boost news coverage of the family courts, as I understand is the plan, I have my doubts.

And finally, HM Courts and Tribunals Service (‘HMCTS’) and the Ministry of Justice have announced that video hearings are being tested in domestic abuse cases. The study by HMCTS at Manchester Civil Justice Centre means vulnerable people can appear before the court using a video link from a computer in their solicitor’s office, avoiding the distress of appearing in court at an already difficult time. This has been used in six cases so far and feedback from those involved has apparently been positive. Testing will continue in the family and civil courts during the coming months and is being independently evaluated. Justice Minister, Lucy Frazer, said: “We are hearing that, even in the early stages, testing fully video hearings are having a positive effect and ensuring the justice system is supporting people at one of the most difficult times in their lives. I look forward to seeing the evaluation of this work and ensuring we continue to improve access to our courts through new innovations.” An interesting development.

Have a good weekend.

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Author: John Bolch

In re H.D.

(California Court of Appeal) – Appellate court reversed the judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother. The mother suffered from addiction and agreed to let ex-husband assume full custody until she was able to get clean and sober. When the mother sought to regain custody, suit was filed against mother claiming she abandoned children. Appellate court said that there had to be an intent to abandon and there was not under these facts.


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Risk of oppressive litigation as a defence in a Hague abduction case

In child abduction cases we have often seen the ‘abducting’ parent raise the ‘grave risk of harm’ defence to an application by the other parent for the summary return of the child to its ‘home’ country. To put that in a little more detail, the abducting parent removes the child from its home country without the other parent’s consent, the other parent makes an application under the Hague Convention on Child Abduction for the summary return of the child, and the abducting parent raises the ‘defence’ under Article 13(b) of the Convention, namely that to order the summary return would result in a grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm, or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

Obviously, the allegations relied upon to raise the defence can vary tremendously. In the recent case MB v TB one of the allegations relied upon by the mother was slightly unusual: the father’s relentless and oppressive use of the legal system in the ‘home’ country (in the context of his greater means) to obstruct the mother’s care of the child in that jurisdiction. The case suggests that, for most countries at least, it is likely to be difficult to persuade the English court that such an allegation will make out the defence.

The facts of the case were as follows. Both parents are Israeli citizens.  They have one child, ‘L’, who was born in London in 2010. She is an Israeli citizen and a British national. The parties’ relationship broke down in 2012, whilst the mother was residing in Israel, and the parents separated. The father returned to reside permanently in Israel shortly after the mother. L therefore resided in Israel with the mother, from 2012.

After the separation the parents engaged in family court proceedings in Israel. An agreement in relation to custody issues, divorce and ancillary financial issues was endorsed by the court in October 2013, which provided for L to have regular contact with the father. Notwithstanding this, the mother alleged that the father had engaged in a campaign to alienate L from her, and between 2013 and 2017 there was extensive litigation between the parties in the Israeli courts. As Mr Justice MacDonald, hearing the case in the High Court, explained:

“…the mother submits that the course of that litigation was dictated by an intention on the part of the father to use the legal system in a relentless and oppressive effort to obstruct her care of L in that jurisdiction.”

I won’t go into the details of the litigation (you can find a summary in paragraph 22 of the judgment), but there were certainly a remarkable number of court applications issued by both parties between 2013 and 2017: twenty-four by the mother and thirty-six by the father. The parents finally agreed (or so it seemed at the time) to cease all litigation, in November 2017.

On the 6th of November 2018 the mother abducted L to this country. She accepted that the abduction was unlawful. The father applied under the Convention for the summary return of L to Israel, and the mother raised her Article 13 ‘defence’, as mentioned above. The defence also alleged that L was being alienated from her by the father and his new wife, such that there was a risk that L would no longer wish to live with the mother.

Mr Justice MacDonald did not find the defence made out. There was no evidence of alienation. As to the oppressive litigation allegation, it was true both that there had been a substantial amount of litigation between the parents, and that the father was in a better financial position than the mother to sustain that litigation. It was also true that there was likely to be further litigation if L was returned to Israel. However, the English court could be confident that the courts in Israel would take the steps necessary to ensure that any further litigation between her parents, however undesirably protracted, would not be allowed to lead to a grave risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place L in an intolerable situation. Further, the litigation to date had not inflicted appreciable emotional harm on L. There was also no evidence, as the mother asserted, that her mental health would be so affected by further litigation as to disable her from caring for L.

Accordingly, Mr Justice MacDonald ordered that L should be summarily returned to Israel. He concluded his judgment with this familiar appeal to the parents:

“What is clear beyond peradventure is that it is well past time for these parents to stop litigating and start cooperating with regard to L’s welfare. Whilst I am satisfied that L has, happily, the resilience to meet the challenges presented by her parents seeming inability at times to discharge their collective responsibility as parents without resorting to squabbling and bickering between themselves in the courts, L should not have to rely on that resilience to protect her from the emotional consequences of her parents’ inability to collaborate in her best interests. Rather, L is entitled to expect both her parents to prioritise her best interests by co-operating in respect of her welfare. Whilst November 2017 appears now to have represented a false dawn in this regard, it is to be hoped that the parents can now, finally, start putting L first.”

Let us hope that they do.

You can read the full judgment here.

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Author: John Bolch

The benefits of prenuptial agreements

Prenuptial agreements are oftentimes misunderstood and provide a variety of advantages for couples who are considering marriage. Prenuptial agreements can protect the interests of both parties entering the marriage and are not just for couples with a significant amount of assets or for only the wealthy to consider.

Prenuptial agreements include the benefits of financial planning and clarifying responsibilities during the marriage, ensuring the new spouses are protected from the debts of the other and can also provide important protections for children from previous marriages or relationships, especially if a marriage comes later in life. Prenuptial agreements can help clarify how assets should be handled in circumstances of death and can avoid time-consuming and expensive disputes in the event there is a divorce.

There are a variety of legal complexities related to property and property division in Texas is it is helpful for the couple to be familiar with what these are. In addition, there are legal requirements to ensure the prenuptial agreement is valid that it is also important for couples considering a prenuptial agreement to be familiar with and ensure are taken care of. Without a prenuptial agreement, the parties will be subject to the state’s property division laws if they divorce.

Prenuptial agreements offer many advantages, including providing couples with more decisions-making power over their own affairs. Postnuptial agreements may also be an option couples should be familiar with and can consider. Because a prenuptial agreement can protect the interests of both parties, and offers so many advantages, couples considering marriage should be familiar with this important legal option.


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Author: On behalf of Katie L. Lewis of Katie L. Lewis, P.C. Family Law

The reality of judicial discretion in family law

As I am sure most family lawyers would agree, it is always worth listening to Mr. Justice Mostyn.  Recently the Hong Kong Family Law Association were treated to a speech by him on the subject of judicial discretion, and I wanted to share it with readers of this blog.

For the benefit of non-lawyers, judicial discretion refers to the situation in which the judge can apparently make any one of a range of possible decisions, having regard to the facts of the case. That is not to say that there are no limits upon what the judge can order, just that the decision can be anywhere in between the limits. As Mr Justice Mostyn explains, judicial discretion apparently exists in several areas of family law, but readers of this blog are perhaps likely to come across it in its most obvious form in the realm of financial remedies following divorce, where the judge can (seemingly) divide the assets in any way that he or she sees fit.

But does true judicial discretion exist, or is it just an illusion? Does it simply appear that the judge has full discretion, when they are actually just making a value judgment? Mr Justice Mostyn seeks to answer this question in his speech and concludes that, save in one situation, true judicial discretion does not actually exist in family law.

What, then, is the difference between an exercise of discretion and the formation of a value judgment? Mr Justice Mostyn says this:

“In a true discretionary situation, the court makes its pick from a range of choices none of which can be said to be exclusively right and none of which can be said to be wrong. In an evaluation the court is subjectively weighing concrete (“primary”) facts to determine the right result. If the required decision is a binary choice – a yes/no question – then, I would argue, the exercise is surely evaluative.”

Mr Justice Mostyn then examines how decisions are made in the various areas of family law in which judicial discretion apparently exists. For the purpose of this post, I will refer only to the financial remedies example.

Mr Justice Mostyn divides his argument between two factors that are at play in financial remedies cases: the ‘sharing principle’ (whereby, as a general guide, an equal division of assets between husband and wife should be departed from only if, and to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so), and the needs of the parties.

The application of the sharing principle, argues Mr Justice Mostyn, “is exclusively one of evaluation and there is nothing discretionary about it.” The process is to evaluate what assets of the marriage comprise ‘matrimonial property’ (i.e. essentially property acquired during the marriage), and to divide that property equally. There is no discretion involved.

Consideration of the needs of the parties, however, is the exception referred to above, where there is true judicial discretion. Here, the judge assesses the needs of the parties by reference to a number of factors. However, says Mr Justice Mostyn:

“This is not an “unfettered” or even a broad discretion. It is fettered and narrow. It is a discretion which is regulated by, and subordinated to, rules.”

Why does any of this matter? What difference does it make to those involved in family court proceedings?

Mr Justice Mostyn argues that:

“…most so-called discretionary situations are not in fact discretionary but require instead the formation of value judgments … such a process is fundamentally rules-based. In those situations where a true discretion is to be exercised, again, the process is always subordinated to clear rules and guidelines.

And he goes on:

“In the realm of discretion why do rules matter? The answer is simple. It is so that like cases are treated alike, and so that lawyers can confidently predict the result of a case in order to give good advice about settlement.”

Hmm. I suspect that there will be quite a large proportion of family lawyers who would find this a little difficult to swallow. Throughout my career, the position of most family lawyers attempting to advise clients as to what financial settlement the court is going to order has been to explain that the judge has a discretion as to what order he or she can make, and therefore that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to say precisely what order they will make. This is not intended to be a ‘cop-out’ by the lawyers, trying to avoid committing themselves to something they will not be able to deliver, but a statement of the reality of the situation.

Having said that, I do think that Mr Justice Mostyn has a point. In many cases the reality is that there is no real discretion – the judge’s decision does simply boil down to a value judgment, constrained by rules and guidelines. Lawyerly thinking along those lines may just make it a little easier to advise clients.

You can read the full speech here.

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Author: John Bolch

Top seven myths of adultery

Affairs are often a symptom of a failing marriage rather than the cause.  We frequently work with clients who are seeking a divorce because they have found out their spouse is having an affair and clients who are the ones having the affair.

An affair does not necessarily mean the end of the marriage but for those couples where it is a deal-breaker, there so many myths surrounding adultery and divorce. Often offered as fact from well-meaning friends and family, we asked Rebecca Coates from our Tunbridge Wells office to dispel her top seven myths of adultery.

“I am always surprised when advising clients about adultery, the many misconceptions that exist about the law. Even those clients who wish to use it as a supporting fact in their divorce petition. So, I decided to bust the seven myths I hear the most.

Myth one: Adultery covers any sexual behaviour

This is not true. Adultery is defined as sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to each other but at least one of whom is a married person. Attempts to commit adultery do not amount to adultery but could be used as examples of unreasonable behaviour. If your spouse has an affair with a member of the same sex this does not constitute as adultery in the eyes of the law

Myth two: You must name the person who your husband/wife committed the adultery with

There is no requirement to do this. You should only name them if you think the respondent is going to defend proceedings. The person with whom it is alleged that the respondent has committed adultery with, will be called the “co-respondent.” The co-respondent will be made a party to the proceedings and will be served with copies of the divorce petition.

Myth three: Adultery petitions are very common.

They are quite rare. Not only does the person filing the divorce petition have to have knowledge that the adultery has taken place (suspicion does not count) but the respondent must admit to the adultery.

If the respondent fails to admit to the adultery, the Court will arrange a hearing and both parties will be required to give evidence.

Generally, it is not possible to provide direct evidence so circumstantial evidence may be relied on. The Court may also require evidence not just of an opportunity to commit adultery, but also of an inclination or passion to commit it.

Once the Court has heard and/or read all the evidence, it will make a decision as to whether the respondent committed adultery based on the balance of probabilities.

This approach carries a certain amount of risk and I always recommend to clients that want to serve a divorce petition on the grounds of adultery, that they agree with their ex-spouse beforehand that they will admit to the adultery and complete and sign the Acknowledgement of Service form.

Alternatively, you can use the supporting fact of your spouse’s unreasonable behaviour but refer to the adultery as an example of their behaviour. A reference of “improper association,” can also be listed as another example of their unreasonable behaviour.

Myth four: I will get a better divorce settlement because my spouse cheated

A common myth but regardless of whether your divorce on the grounds of adultery, the adulterous behaviour of you or your ex-spouse has very little bearing on the financial settlement overall.

Myth five: Adultery petitions have no time limits

No, incorrect. If you have found out about your spouse’s adultery but have continued to live with them for a period exceeding six months, you are barred from relying on adultery.

For the avoidance of doubt, living together is defined as living with each other in the same household. I have been asked “What if the adultery is continuing? How does that work with the time limit?” The answer is that for this purpose, adultery refers to one act of adultery. Therefore, where the adultery continues, the time limit will not run until the last act of adultery.

Myth six: Adultery before marriage will still count if you find out about it after the marriage

If the affair took place before you were married, then it is not considered adultery. It is only considered adultery if the affair continues after the marriage.

Myth seven: It is not adultery if you have separated from your ex-spouse.

In the eyes of the law, you are committing adultery. If you are separated from your spouse and you sleep with a member of the opposite sex this is adultery under English Law as you are still legally married.

Even if you are living apart, have agreed to see other people or your ex-spouse is aware of the relationship it is still adultery and can be used as the basis of a divorce petition.”

Get in touch

If you are looking for advice on adultery and divorce, please do contact our Client Care Team here.

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Author: Rebecca Coates

I am a one in ten. Or should that be four in ten?*

The real lesson that the figure for couples needing the court to sort out arrangements for their children teaches us.

As I have said here many times before, I practised family law for about twenty-five years, during which time I dealt with thousands of cases. With that experience I thought I had acquired a reasonably good understanding of family breakdown generally, and the problems that arise from it. In particular I believed I had obtained a fairly accurate impression of what proportion of separating couples were unable to resolve their problems without recourse to the courts.

My impression was that there were broadly three categories: those couples who could resolve their problems without needing a lawyer, those couples who were able to resolve their problems with the assistance of a lawyer or a mediator, and those couples who required to court to resolve their problems.  Obviously, I had nothing to do with the first category, so I could only guess as to their numbers. As to the second category, it seemed to me that this comprised the majority of my clients, and those who had to go to court comprised the minority. And of those who had to go to court the majority were able to settle without having to rely upon the court to impose a decision at the final hearing.

In short, it seemed to me that the number of couples who relied upon the court to resolve their problems was relatively small. Accordingly, when I first heard it mentioned some years ago (I don’t recall where) that only about 10% of separating couples go to court to resolve children disputes, that seemed to confirm my impression. That ‘10% rule’ has often since been repeated, to the point that it became generally accepted, including by me. However, new thinking on the subject has thrown my impression into doubt.

I know that many have challenged my impression in the past, but I was first really alerted to this new thinking in a speech that the new President of the Family Division Sir Andrew McFarlane gave to the Resolution Conference last month, and that has since been taken up by a post that the fathers’ rights group Families Need Fathers (‘FNF’) had published here last week.

Sir Andrew referred to work done on the subject by Teresa Williams, the Director of Strategy at CAFCASS. He said that figures she had compiled indicated “that around 38% of couples need to go to court to resolve disagreements over how they should care for their child post-separation”, which he called “a far cry from the previous comfortable urban myth based on a figure of 10%.” He went on to say that this new figure:

“…indicates a major societal problem, with nearly 40% of parents unable to sort out the arrangements for their own child without the need [to] apply for a court order.”

Hmm. 40%? That does seem awfully high. As I said above, I always subscribed to the ‘10% rule’, for the simple reason that, based upon my twenty-five odd years’ experience practising as a family lawyer, it ‘seemed about right’. I am prepared to accept that the 10% figure may actually be on the low side, but I’m quite sure that it was not the case that four out of ten of my clients with children had to go to court to sort out arrangements for them (and that is ignoring the number of couples who never needed to consult a lawyer anyway).

Of course, there is a major difference between how things are now and how they were when I was practising: the lack of legal aid. When I was practising, legal aid was available to all, which meant that all couples might have their problems resolved by agreement with the benefit of a lawyer, or a mediator (cases resolved by mediation are now about half the number they were before legal aid was abolished).

Anyway, whatever we think of it, it seems we must now accept the 40% figure as the new gospel. But why does all of this matter?

Well, in a sense it doesn’t. It doesn’t matter to the individual couple whether they are part of 10% or part of 40% of couples who need the court to sort things out for them. And you could say that it doesn’t matter to the court system, which is already (just) dealing with exactly the amount of couples that require its services.

However, both the President and FNF point to what the new figure says about the scale of the problem of parents unable to sort out arrangements for their children themselves, and the need to find new ways of dealing with the problem. That may be so, but if the figure is correct then that is an appalling indictment of parenting in this country. Surely, the vast majority (more like 90%) of parents should be quite capable on their own of working out what was really best for their children? Surely, therefore, the real lesson all of this teaches us is the need to educate regarding how parents should behave when they separate: how they should put their children first, how they should never use them as weapons in any dispute with the other parent, and that it is almost always in the best interests of children to retain as full as possible a relationship with both of their parents. Such a programme of education would I believe substantially increase the proportion of separating parents that are able to resolve their issues themselves, without recourse to the courts, or indeed outside assistance of any sort.

*With apologies to the band UB40 (at least that’s how I recall the lyric).

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Author: John Bolch

A week in family law: Domestic abuse, pension wealth, children funding and online courts

As I mentioned here, the mother of Jayden Parkinson, who was murdered in 2013 by her former boyfriend Ben Blakeley, has called for a ‘domestic abuse register’ to be established, containing details of perpetrators of domestic abuse, violence and stalking. Blakeley, who had a history of violence against previous partners, strangled Jayden, who was then aged 17 and expecting his child, and was later convicted of her murder. He was given a life sentence, with a minimum term of twenty years. Jayden’s mother told the BBC that a system similar to the sex offenders register could have saved her daughter, saying that if Blakeley had been on a register Jayden would “be here now, because for all the agencies at the point when Jayden went missing, to them she was a pain-in-the-butt teenager… and if that register had been here, and they’d all looked at it, they’d have seen how vulnerable she was.” The question, of course, is whether we need such a register, and I look at that in my post.

As I reported here, research by a wealth planning company has found that 550 couples with net financial wealth of one million pounds or more each will divorce this year, and that these couples possess assets worth an average of some £3.48 million each. The research found that on average about 43% of those assets, worth more than one and a half million pounds, comprised private pension wealth. Financial wealth represented 20% of the assets, worth on average about £712,000; property wealth comprised 31% of the assets, worth on average about £1,075,000; and physical wealth represented 5% of the assets, worth on average about £186,000. Sadly, I may not possess anything remotely like this sort of wealth, but I can say that the figures emphasise the significance of pensions in high net worth divorces, and the need to obtain the best possible advice, both legal and financial.

A report by the House of Commons Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee into the funding of local authorities’ children’s services has found that children’s services in England are at ‘breaking point’, and need a £3.1 billion minimum funding boost by 2025. The report, which you can read here, said that as services tried to respond to growing demand amid severe funding pressures, many were reliant on the goodwill of staff, as local authorities grappled with budget cuts of 29% since 2010. Clive Betts MP, who chairs the committee, commented: “Over the last decade we have seen a steady increase in the number of children needing support, whilst at the same time funding has failed to keep up. It is clear that this approach cannot be sustained and the government must make serious financial and systemic changes to support local authorities in helping vulnerable children. They must understand why demand is increasing and whether it can be reduced. They must ensure that the funding formula actually allows local authorities to meet the obligations for supporting children that the government places on them.” Quite.

And finally, on the 1st of May I received a press release from the Ministry of Justice that declared “Even more people set to benefit from online court reform”. The sub-heading told me that “New legislation making it even easier for court users to apply for small money claims or divorce online was unveiled in the House of Lords today”. The new legislation is the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill. Unfortunately, as at the time of writing, the Bill doesn’t appear to have been published, so all I can tell you about it is what the press release said, which isn’t that much. Apparently, the Bill will set up a new “judicially chaired committee tasked with developing new, simplified rules around online services in civil, family and tribunal proceedings.” It will also ensure that cases will be progressed more efficiently and allow financial savings made across the justice system. We are also told that “Easy to follow guidance will ensure online services are as simple as possible to navigate and increase access to justice while supporting the uptake of HM Courts and Tribunals Service’ online services.” Sounds wonderful, although quite what all of this will mean in practice, I’ve no idea. (Update: the Bill has now been published, here.)

Have a good weekend, and Early May bank holiday.

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Author: John Bolch

Divorces declared void after being issued within one year of marriage

Sir James Munby’s judgment in Baron & Others (4 Defective Divorces) hit the headlines recently, but not actually because of the subject-matter of the case (the headlines, as I mentioned here, were to do with Sir James’s comments regarding the inefficiency of some Regional Divorce Units).

What the former President of the Family Division was actually considering in the case was applications by the Queen’s Proctor for the setting aside of divorce decrees in four different cases, on the ground that the petitions had been presented before the expiration of the period of one year from the date of the marriage. As I explained here recently, the Queen’s Proctor is an officer of the judiciary, who may intervene in divorce proceedings “to argue before the court any question in relation to the matter which the court considers it necessary or expedient to have fully argued”. (The case referred to in that post was one of five, the other four being considered in the Baron case).

To explain for those who are not aware, the present law forbids the filing of a divorce petition before the expiration of the period of one year from the date of the marriage. Accordingly, any petition filed before then is null and void. And this, it seems, will not change when (and if) the proposed no-fault divorce is introduced, as the government intends to retain this ‘one-year bar’, which it believes “serves a useful purpose to underline the importance of commitments made at the time of marriage”. Accordingly, if the government gets its way this case will still be relevant when the law on divorce changes.

I’m not going to go into the legal niceties of whether failure to comply with the one year rule is a matter that can be corrected by the court, or whether it means that the petition is a nullity (you can find the details in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the judgment). Suffice to say that Sir James found in favour of the latter.

So to the four cases.

In the first case the parties were married on the 23rd of August 2012. The wife issued her divorce petition on the 28th of May 2013. No one spotted the error and the divorce eventually went through (i.e. to decree absolute) in August 2018. As Sir James said, “the case admits of no possible argument”. Accordingly, he declared the divorce void.

In the second case the parties were married on the 28th of May 2015. The wife issued her divorce petition on the 20th of May 2016. No one spotted the error and the divorce went through in January 2017. Again, said Sir James, the case admitted of no possible argument. Accordingly, he also declared this divorce void.

In the third case the parties were married on the 26th of July 2014. The husband post-dated his petition 27th of July 2015, but sent it to the court on the 17th of June 2015, and the court issued it on the 22nd of June. Without going into the details, the divorce was made absolute on the 11th of October 2016. Once again, Sir James found that the case admitted of no possible argument, and declared the divorce void.

The fourth case was slightly different. The parties were married on the 16th of January 2015. The wife issued her divorce petition on the 13th of January 2016. The divorce went through in September 2016, but the problem was then identified, and the court set aside the decrees. A fresh petition was issued, and fresh divorce decrees made. Unfortunately, there was an administrative error by the court in that it failed to properly process the fresh petition. However, Sir James held that this did not nullify the ‘new’ divorce, which remained valid.

In all of the cases the parties had issued new petitions for divorce, in order to preserve their positions. In each of the first three cases Sir James went on to grant a decree nisi, and to abridge the time for the decree absolute, from six weeks to four days in the first two cases, and to three weeks in the third case. The new petition in the fourth case was struck out.

The moral from all of this, of course, is to make sure that you comply with the one year rule. It’s an easy trap to fall into, but one that can have serious and expensive consequences, not least the possibility of bigamy if a party remarries when they were not actually divorced.

You can read Sir James’s full judgment here.

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Author: John Bolch